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Abstract: The future Internet of Things as an intelligent collaboration of minia-
turized sensors poses new challenges to security and end-user privacy. The ITU has
identified that the protection of data and privacy of users is one of the key chal-
lenges in the Internet of Things [Int05]: lack of confidence about privacy will result
in decreased adoption among users and therefore is one of the driving factors in the
success of the Internet of Things. This paper gives an overview, categorization, and
analysis of security and privacy challenges in the Internet of Things.
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1 Introduction
The Internet has undergone severe changes since its first launch in the late 1960s as an outcome
of the ARPANET. The initial four-node network has quickly grown into a highly interconnected
and self-organized network that builds the daily basis for business, research, and economy. The
number of people using this worldwide network has exponentially grown up to about 1.5 bn and
hereby makes up about 20% of the world population. This sheer number of end users – that
does not even comprise servers and routers inside the networks – has changed our daily life and
habits. With the miniaturization of devices, increase of computational power, and reduction of
energy consumption, this trend will continue – the Internet of Things.
One of the most challenging topics in such an interconnected world of miniaturized systems
and sensors are security and privacy aspects: without sureness that safety of private information
is assured and adequate security is provided, users will be unwilling to adopt this new technology
that invisibly integrates into their environment and life. Besides technical solutions to provide
privacy and security, further instruments – like governmental and ethical institutions, that we will
not cover here – need to get established and applied.
Having every ‘thing’ connected to the global future Internet and ‘things’ communicating with
each other, new security and privacy problems arise, e. g., confidentiality, authenticity, and in-
tegrity of data sensed and exchanged by ‘things’. Privacy of humans and things must be ensured
to prevent unauthorized identification and tracking. Further, the more autonomous and intelli-
gent things get, problems like the identity and privacy of things, and responsibility of things in
their acting will arise. Up to now, corrupted digital systems were mostly not able to act in the
physical world. This will change dramatically in a dangerous way that corrupted digital systems
can now operate in and influence the physical world. What happens, once a corrupted thing
killed a person?
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The sequel of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 performs an analysis of the compo-
nents in the Internet of Things, their sensitivity to security and privacy, as well as an analysis of
the state in research for topics considered as highly sensitive. In Section 3 two major components
in the Internet of Things – Global Sensor Networks and RFID – are introduced and detailed on
related security and privacy work. Three research results from other fields that we believe are
worth investigating for the Internet of Things are introduced in Section 4. Finally, concluding
remarks are given in Section 5.
2 Analysis of Security and Privacy
As the Internet of Things is a large field with diverse technologies used, we provide a catego-
rization of topics and technologies in Section 2.1. The categorization serves as base to detail on
the security and privacy sensitivity in the respective fields. Section 2.2 then looks into the state
of research in the identified categories and details on topics that have insufficient research from
our point of view.
2.1 Categorization and Sensitivity
Figure 1 shows a categorization of topics – inner items – and respective technologies used in
each topic – outer items – that make up the Internet of Things. In our opinion the Internet of
Things can be categorized into eight topics:
• Communication to enable information exchange between devices
• Sensors for capturing and representing the physical world in the digital world
• Actuators to perform actions in the physical world triggered in the digital world
• Storage for data collection from sensors, identification and tracking systems
• Devices for interaction with humans in the physical world
• Processing to provide data mining and services
• Localization and Tracking for physical world location determination and tracking
• Identification to provide unique physical object identification in the digital world
Each topics has different technologies attached (outer items) that are used in the respective
topic. Note, that the categorization given in this work is not strictly hierarchical in terms of top-
ics and technologies. Identification, e. g., is actually a form of Processing that results from the
use of Sensors. As we believe that Identification has a special role in the Internet of Things that
is independent of physical world sensing, it is handled as a separate topic. Some technologies
appear multiple times: RFID, e. g., is used as Communication technology, provides Identifica-
tion, Localization and Tracking, RFID readers act as Sensors, and finally RFID tags and readers
make up Devices in the Internet of Things. The manifold usage of RFID assigns it a special role
that is detailed in Section 3.2.
The topics introduced are listed again in Table 1 and rated with respect to properties of security
and privacy. The properties are taken from the CIA Triad (without Non-repudiation) and the
Parkerian Hexad (without Possession or Control andUtility). The additional property Regulation
represents the need for laws and regulations in this topic. For each topic the table contains the
sensitivity for the respective property. As our categorization is not strictly hierarchical, sensitivity














































Figure 1: Categorization of topics and technologies in the Internet of Things
XXXXXXXXXTopic
Property
Integrity Authenticity Confidentiality Privacy Availability Regulation
Communication +++ +++ +++ ++ +++ +
Sensors +++ ++ + +++ + +++
Actuators + + + + ++
Storage +++ ++ +++ +++ + +++
Devices +++ + + ++ ++ ++
Processing ++ + + +++ + +++
Localization/Tracking + + +++ +++ +++ +++
Identification ++ + +++ +++ +++ +++
Table 1: Sensitivity of topics in the Internet of Things to different security and privacy proper-
ties, and the need for laws and regulations (+ low sensitivity, ++ middle sensitivity, +++ high
sensitivity)
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sometimes is based on sensitivity of other properties. We will now describe the decisions for the
chosen sensitivity values.
Communication Research in communication protocols has come up with solutions that pro-
vide integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality – examples are TLS, or IPSec. Privacy needs have
been tackled by different routing schemes like Onion Routing, or Freenet but unfortunately are
not in wide use. An open issue – despite strong research – is disturbed availability through DDoS
attacks. In regulations we currently see a low need.
Sensors The integrity and authenticity of sensor data is a current research target that can be
handled, e. g., in the form of watermarking [JKK08]. Confidentiality of sensor data is a weak
requirement, as an attacker can just place its own sensor physically near and sense the same
values. Therefore, the need for sensor confidentiality at the sensor itself is low and confidentiality
therefore relies on Communication confidentiality. Privacy in sensors mainly targets the physical
world that is getting sensed. Mechanisms like face blurring in video data need to be employed
to preserve the privacy of humans and objects in the physical world. The availability of sensors
mostly depends on the Communication infrastructure. Regulations are necessary to preserve the
privacy of people who are currently most often unaware of sensors – like video cameras – in their
environment.
Actuators The Integrity, Authenticity, and Confidentiality of data send to an actuator mostly
depends on the Communication security, therefore low sensitivity of the actuator itself is neces-
sary. What must be assured, is that an attacker can not control the actuator (we will come back
to this property when looking at Devices). Privacy in actuators is highly specific to the scenario,
therefore we don’t give a general rating on sensitivity. Whether availability of an Actuator is crit-
ical highly depends on the kind of actuator, but can generally be rated as sensitive. Regulations
are similar to sensors and must assure that the use of actuators does not disturb privacy.
Storage Security mechanisms for storage devices are well-established, but employment is still
weak. As storage of data is highly privacy-sensitive and reports on data breaches are common,
regulations must be extended to provide adequate protection of user privacy. Availability of
storage mostly depends on availability of Communication infrastructure and well-established
mechanisms for storage redundancy.
Devices In the scope of devices integrity means that a device is free of malware. This property
has also been called ‘admissibility’ [Sch06]. Ensuring admissibility is an open issue currently
researched in Trusted Platform Computing (TPM) and highly sensitive. The authenticity of a
device is mostly handled in the Communication part and there seen as connection endpoint.
Confidentiality in a device goes with the integrity in ensuring that no third party has access to
the devices internal data. This is normally ensured in case of device integrity. Privacy of devices
depends on physical privacy and Communication privacy. Availability of a device depends on
the devices integrity and reliability, and availability of the Communication part that connects the
device.
Processing Integrity in the Processing of data for higher services and correlation is based on
Device integrity and integrity of Communication. Furthermore, it depends on the correct design
and implementation of algorithms for processing. As Processing can often be followed by Actu-
ator actions it is sensitive in that an actuator may get incorrect commands. The Authenticity of




Integrity Authenticity Confidentiality Privacy Availability
Communication 2 2 3 1
Sensors 2 1
Actuators
Storage 3 3 1
Devices 1
Processing 1
Localization/Tracking 3 1 2
Identification 3 1 2
Table 2: State of research for highly sensitive properties (1 research needed, 2 basic research
available, 3 adequate research available)
Processing solely depends on the authenticity of the Device and authenticity of Communication,
and therefore in itself is not sensitive to Processing. The property of confidentiality in Process-
ing is only dependent on the integrity of the device, and – in case of distributed Processing –
dependent on the integrity of the Communication. Processing is of major privacy and critical to
Storage. Privacy preserving data mining is available, but regulations must be employed to make
sure they are applied and applied correctly. The availability of Processing depends on the Device
and Communication availability solely.
Localization and Tracking Integrity of Localization and Tracking is especially based on Com-
munication integrity. Furthermore, the integrity of reference signals used in Localization, e. g.
GSM or GPS cell, need to be ensured. Likewise, the Authenticity depends on Communication
authenticity and Device integrity. Confidentiality and privacy of localization and tracking data
are of high importance to ensure user privacy and therefore highly sensitive. Confidentiality in
this context means that an attacker is not able to reveal localization data and therefore is mainly
based on Communication confidentiality. Privacy in Localization data means that (1) there is no
way for an attacker to reveal the identity of the person or object the localization data is attached
to and (2) that Localization and Tracking is not possible without the explicit agreement or knowl-
edge. Availability of localization is important to ensure that the reference signals for localization
are robust and can not be manipulated by an attacker. We think that regulations in Localization
and Tracking are of high importance mainly in terms of privacy, as mentioned above.
Identification For Identification we see mainly the same sensitivities as for Localization and
Tracking. One difference is the higher sensitivity in integrity. We think it is easier for an attacker
to manipulate the identification process as it is to manipulate the localization process. This results
mainly due to the technology used (e. g. RFID or biometry) that we think is more feasible for an
attacker to manipulate than localization technologies (e. g. GSM).
2.2 State of Research
Wewill now look into the state of research for the properties rated highly sensitive in Section 2.1.
Table 2 shows the properties rated as highly sensitive in Section 2.1 along with our rating of the
state of research. For highly sensitive properties with a research rating of 1 we will explain in
more detail why we think that research in this area is currently insufficient.
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Communication Mechanisms for securing Communication are well-established but unfortu-
nately seldom applied. Especially in small devices with weak processing power Communication
security is often weak or missing. Availability of Communication is a big problem that is caused
by botnets and DDoS attacks that exploit the best-effort service provided by IP.
Sensors A major problem in Sensors is privacy. This is mainly caused by people not know-
ing that they are being sensed. Langheinrich [Lan01] defines several guidelines to handle this
problem in the design phase: (1) users must be aware that they are being sensed (‘notice’), (2)
users must be able to choose whether they are being sensed and be able to opt-out (‘choice and
consent’), and (3) users must be able to remain anonymous (‘anonymity and pseudonymity’). As
the user has no way to tell whether a ubiquitous system integrates these guidelines we believe
that regulations must be employed.
Storage Mechanisms for integrity and confidentiality in Storage are well-established, but un-
fortunately often complex to employ. Privacy issues, however, are – besides Sensor privacy – one
of the main privacy problems in the Internet of Things. Anonymization and pseudonymization
mechanisms must be used to ensure that data does not contain information sensitive to privacy.
Often, too much information is stored that is not necessary for the actual system, as mentioned
lately by Schneier [Sch08].
Devices The integrity of devices – called ‘admissibility’ in [Sch06] – is an unresolved issue.
Research in Trusted Platform Computing aims at protecting the integrity of devices. Although
TPM modules have been built into laptops for some time now, fully TPM-capable operating
systems are still missing.
Processing Mechanisms for data processing must assure sure that no sensitive information is
available in processed data that is forwarded to untrusted Devices or Storage. Mechanisms for
privacy preserving data mining exist [VBF+04] – e. g. adding noise – but are applied seldom.
Regulations need to define a standard set of privacy preserving mechanisms that must be applied
in Processing.
Localization and Tracking, and Identification For Localization and Tracking, as well as
Identification we see the same research requirements: the privacy of users that are being local-
ized, identified, or tracked. In all cases the user must be able to opt-out and be notified of the
process. This has been defined by Langheinrich as ‘Choice and Consent’.
To summarize, we see specific need for research in the availability of Communication due to
DDoS and the best-effort service provided by IP. Furthermore, the Integrity of devices to make
sure they are free from malware like spyware or rootkits needs more research. Finally, nearly
all areas miss applicable mechanisms in privacy for the Internet of Things. The guidelines
by Langheinrich are very helpful for system designers, but we suggest that (1) regulations are
needed to ensure systems conform to these guidelines, and (2) mechanisms must be developed
that provide users with possibilities in actively protecting their privacy instead of only relying
on that systems in the Internet of Things respect their privacy and implement respective mecha-
nisms.
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3 Major players in the Internet of Things
We will now shortly detail on GSN Middleware and – more in-depth – on RFID technology.
Besides background on RFID we will detail on GSN and RFID security in Section 3.1 and
Section 3.2, respectively.
3.1 Global Sensor Network Middleware
A lot of work has been performed in the last years about middleware architectures that con-
nect sensors and sensor networks into the global infrastructure of the Internet [Oll07, AHS06,
FJK+05, GKK+03] and therewith enable advanced sensing applications. Security aspects in the
work on middleware have mostly been derived from security needs that arise when connecting
multiple heterogeneous networks over the Internet – the topic of Connection in our categoriza-
tion. However, the new security and privacy issues that arise when integrating the physical with
the digital world in the Internet of Things need to be covered by future research. In the follow-
ing, work in security and privacy in Global Sensor Network Middleware systems is detailed on
shortly.
IrisNet The IrisNet Architecture [GKK+03] for distributed sensing uses Webcams as sensors.
Security is based on the assumption that ‘the entire worldwide sensor web is administered by a
single, universally trusted authority’. It therefore can be secured using communication security
mechanisms. To counter privacy concerns in the video data IrisNet implements face blurring. As
one scenario in IrisNet is monitoring of free parking-lots, if is a good example that anonymization
does not necessarily limit data utility.
HiFi The HiFi [FJK+05] specifies a hierarchical architecture of ‘levels’. Data is forwarded
from the lowest level – actual sensor data sources like RFID or sensor networks – over interme-
diate levels upwards. Levels perform specific tasks: the lowest level ‘cleans’ the data and only
forwards data items that comply to a specific quality standard (like RFID signal strength). Higher
levels ‘smooth’ and ‘validate’ data. Privacy and access control is implemented using SQL views
for the specification of authorization policies.
ETRI Ubiquitous Sensor Network An analysis of security threats in the ETRI project is given
in [KLR07]. The following security requirements are identified: Threats toward applications like
unauthorized users acquiring sensing data, applications disrupting the functionality of the sen-
sor network by reconfiguring sensor nodes, and performing Denial-of-Service attacks through
large numbers of sensing requests. Threats from corrupted sensor networks that provide in-
valid sensing data, therewith distorting application results. Threats from external objects like
eavesdropping. Furthermore, replay attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks are possible when an
attacker positions itself between the application and a layer of the middleware system.
3.2 RFID
An RFID tag is a small integrated circuit that contains a unique ID that identifies this special item
– not only the item group as done with barcodes. RFID readers can query the tags and receive the
unique item ID. The ID is then the entry key into a database that contains additional information
about the item. Often, the ID is built in a hierarchical form that contains, e. g. the manufacturer,
the group class, and the item ID.
The RFID market is growing rapidly with 1.02 bn tags sold alone in 2006, and a $5.20 bn
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market value in 2008 [DH08]. These numbers are predicted to grow and RFID tags posing
an important technology in the Internet of Things. With current passive RFID tags having no
sensing capabilities, the sensors in an RFID scenario are the RFID readers. Future RFID tags
will incorporate advanced sensing and communication capabilities, so the sensor part will also
be available in the RFID tag itself.
As RFID tags identify unique items, privacy issues arise as the tracking of items – and with this
tracking of the person who carries, wears, has implanted the item – becomes possible. Therefore,
different cryptographic techniques have been proposed with the goal that only authorized parties
are able to reveal the real ID of the tag. A good overview of such techniques is given in [PM07].
As different RFID tags exist (e. g. active, passive, semi-active) with different computational
capabilities, different mechanisms exist for security and privacy.
Security and privacy in RFID systems has been defined as [Ban08]:
• Security: ‘The ability of the RFID system to keep the information transmitted between
the tag and the reader secure from non-intended recipients.’
• Privacy: ‘The ability of the RFID system to keep the meaning of the information trans-
mitted between the tag and the reader secure from non-intended recipients.’
RFID tags have the ability to perform basic operations like XOR, simple hashing, calculating
Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs), and to participate in challenge-response protocols. Therewith
a number of protocols have been proposed that employ challenge-response protocols between a
RFID tag and RFID reader. An RFID reader has access to a database system that includes all
tag IDs and additional information, depending on the protocol. Physical mechanisms to preserve
RFID privacy is detailed in Section 3.2.1 and cryptographic RFID protocols in Section 3.2.2.
3.2.1 Physical Mechanisms
Kill Codes Kill codes permanently disable the tag and therefore prevent reading and tracking.
This is especially useful for items that need tracking in the supply-chain only and not after
customer purchase. RFID applications like easy item reshipment are made impossible.
Faraday Cage Putting an RFID tag into a faraday cage makes it impossible to read the tag.
Enables the user to decide when reading should be possible. A faraday cage renders ubiquitous
services impossible.
Blocker Tag The Blocker Tag [JRS03] performs jamming that makes unauthorized readers
think that a large number of different RFID tags are present. A blocker tag is placed besides the
actual RFID tag, therefore it can be easily applied and removed.
3.2.2 Cryptographic Protocols
Randomized Hash-Lock Protocol A database contains the IDs of all tags IDi, i ∈ {0 . . .n}.
The RFID reader queries the tag a to start the protocol. The tag calculate x = h(IDa|r) using a
hash function h(x), his ID IDa, a random number r, and transmits {x,r} to the server. As the
server knows the IDs of all keys IDi, he calculates y= h(IDi|r) for every i and compares x=? y.
If x matches y the correct ID IDa is found. As the protocol runs in O(n) it can put heavy load at
the server.
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Hash Chain based Protocols The YA-TRAP [Tsu06] protocol requires loose time synchro-
nization between server and readers, tags aren’t required to have clocks. In initialization every
tag i is assigned a triple {Ki,T0,Tmax}, Ki is a tag-specific identifier used as tag ID and crypto-
graphic key, T0 is an initial timestamp, e. g. the time of manufacture, and Tmax is the top value
of timestamps and corresponds to the maximum lifetime of the tag. Every timestamp Tr with
r ∈ {0 . . .max} gets a hashtable HASHTABLEr created in the server database. For every tag i the
values of HMACKi(Tr) are inserted into the tables HASHTABLEr, i. e., for every tag i with key
Ki every hashvalue in every timestamp Tr is precomputed and stored.
The protocol goes as follows: the reader sends the current timestamp Tr to the tag. The tag
remembers the current timestamp as Tt = Tr, computes Hr = HMACKi(Tt) and sends back Hr to
the reader. The server now knows Tr and Hr which is the current timestamp and the hashvalue
for the tag in the current timestamp. It looks into the hashtable HASHTABLEr that contains all
hashes for the current timestamp Tr. By queryingHr of theHASHTABLEr the server can retrieve
Ki which corresponds to the ID of tag i.
4 Research from other Domains
The current Internet has failed in many ways to provide adequate security and privacy. We
present three research results that are worth considering in the Internet of Things. We shortly
present these approaches and motivate in investigating them for the use in the Internet of Things.
4.1 Information Accountability
Since first information systems have been set up and the Web has taken its way to reach millions
of people, the dilemma of privacy in the digital world has begun. Using the same techniques to
protect privacy of people – and maybe the privacy of ‘things’ in the Internet of Things – will
maybe end in the same results: uncontrolled information flow and uncontrolled privacy. The
current large-scale databases storing personal data will get filled up even more in the days of
the Internet of Things and record our every steps. As Schneier warns in [Sch08] we have quite
no way of controlling the collection and use of personal data. Worse, lots of data is linked to
personal information – which is often not necessary. All of this data is collected and stored, but
not deleted, which inevitably result in data garbage that goes uncontrolled.
Weitzner et al. present a new concept to privacy which they call Information Accountability
[WAB+08]. The main principle of information accountability is not to try to prevent the leakage
of data – and being helpless once data leaks – but rather being able to control the usage of the
data. Therewith being able to call persons to account that misuse the data – which is not able
with the current concept of privacy that is based on keeping information secret.
4.2 Cryptographic Identifiers
Cryptographic Identifiers [MC04] are used within several newer networking protocols to prove
ownership of an address. The IPv6 Secure Neighbor Discovery (Send), e. g., uses Cryptograph-
ically Generated Addresses to prevent address spoofing, as possible in the Address Resolution
Protocol (ARP) used in LANs. Furthermore, given the large size of Overlay identifiers, the use
of Cryptographic Identifiers can there be used to prove the ownership of ones identifier. The
Host Identity Protocol (HIP), e. g., bases its security highly on Cryptographic Identifiers.
The Cryptographic Identifiers as RFID IDs would enable tags to prove that they really own
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the ID. With current RFID solutions mainly deployed in self-contained systems, the need to
ownership proof does hardly arise. Having public databases that store all information about a
tags and are publicly queriable, brings up the problem of tag ID spoofing as an attacked can
gather all tag information from the database and then prepare a tag that spoofs its identity as
some other tag. Cryptographic Identifiers can help detect tags that spoof their ID as other tags.
Furthermore, the scheme can be deployed for sensor nodes that take part in an overlay network
where identifiers are long enough to use Cryptographic Identifiers. These nodes can then prove
ownership of their identifier. This allows to detect rogue sensors that spoof as another tag and
possible give out corrupted sensing data.
Cryptographic Identifiers are based on asymmetric-key cryptography and therefore have a
large overhead compared to symmetric-key cryptography in terms of computational power and
key-size. As it has been shown that sensor nodes can be able to perform asymmetric-key cryp-
tography [BZ05], the use of Cryptographic Identifiers in sensor nodes is possible. RFID tags
are quite some time away from performing asymmetric-key cryptography, but will eventually be
able. Therefore, interesting results are to arise when using the RFID tags ID in combination with
Cryptographic Identifiers.
4.3 Key Extraction from Wireless Channel Characteristics
As a large part of communication in the Internet of Things will occur over wireless channels –
that are susceptible to eavesdropping – key establishment is necessary to provide confidential
communication. The work of Mathur et al. [MTM+08] provides the establishment of a common
cryptographic key for two users by the use of characteristics of the wireless channel. As the
wireless channel characteristics for a communication context between A and B are the same
only for exactly A and B, it is possible to use this characteristic to extract bits from stochastic
processes. These bits can then be used to form a symmetric cryptographic key. So, A and B
independently calculate the same symmetric key for the communication between A and B –
solely through the fact that A talks to B and B talks to A.
This scheme seems promising when it comes to wireless communication in the Internet of
Things, because (1) it is based only on symmetric-key cryptography, and (2) it would be expen-
sive to establish key infrastructures or distribute keys in the Internet of Things that is made up of
such large numbers of ‘things’.
5 Conclusions
The Internet of Things is quickly coming closer. The incremental deployment of the technologies
that will make up the Internet of Things must not fail what the Internet has failed to do: provide
adequate security and privacy mechanisms from the start. The introduction of e-passports, e. g.,
has been pushed by politics into deployment with – back then – insufficient privacy mecha-
nisms [JMW05]. We must be sure that adequate security and privacy is available before the
technology gets deployed and becomes part of our daily live.
In this paper we presented a categorization of topics and technologies in the Internet of Things
with analysis of sensitivity and state in research to different security and privacy properties. We
see this (1) as a basis for coming up with an integrated systems approach for security and privacy
in the Internet of Things, and (2) as stimulator for discussion on the categorization and sensitivity
rating in the Internet of Things. Furthermore, we presented research in security and privacy for
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two major technologies in the Internet of Things – GSN and RFID – and finally pointed out
research from other fields in computer science that is worth considering for use in the Internet of
Things.
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